If they could they would not be able to work their jobs after reading this.
Driver Licensing vs. the Right to
Travel
Collection of Legal Citations supporting the Right to Travel
**NOTE: For educational purposes only.
IT IS ALL ABOUT JURISDICTION!Guard your jurisdiction and do not admit it incorrectly!
Manual on
Uniform Traffic Control Devices
This manual is the the standard for compliance for all 50 states for the posting of signs. Signs failing to comply with the guide are deemed not to exist and have no force and effect of law. In other words - if the sign does not comply it does not exist and there is no law in effect making the summons null and void ab nitio.
This manual is the the standard for compliance for all 50 states for the posting of signs. Signs failing to comply with the guide are deemed not to exist and have no force and effect of law. In other words - if the sign does not comply it does not exist and there is no law in effect making the summons null and void ab nitio.
Brief for the Right to Drive
This case Washington v. Port is important s it details how the case for the right to drive can be won. Port lost the case because of her error in admitting the state had a right. Read the case and you will soon see how she could easily have won. She actually had won the case until she said the wrong thing.
This case Washington v. Port is important s it details how the case for the right to drive can be won. Port lost the case because of her error in admitting the state had a right. Read the case and you will soon see how she could easily have won. She actually had won the case until she said the wrong thing.
The following argument has been used in at least three states
(Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia) as a legal brief to
support a demand for dismissal of charges of "driving without
a license." It is the argument that was the reason for the charges to
be dropped, or for a "win" in court against the argument that
free people can have their right to travel regulated by their servants.
These arguments can be used in nearly any state against the state trying to deny
a driver's right to travel.
The forgotten legal maxim is that free people have a right to travel on
the roads which are provided by their servants for that purpose, using ordinary
transportation of the day. Licensing cannot be required of free people,
because taking on the restrictions of a license requires the surrender of
a right. The driver's license can be required of people who use the
highways for trade, commerce, or hire; that is, if they earn their
living on the road, and if they use extraordinary machines on the roads. If you
are not using the highways for profit, you cannot be required to have a
driver's license.
----------------
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF NOTICE FOR DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
If someone asked me how I have defended myself and my position, and took a stand to defend my natural rights, based on the principles of freedom, in honor, without intent to offend, but in realization that many in government who as we have been, were programmed that what they are dong is the normal course of business, may be offended, I would say... here you go.
But understnd, the government functionaries who have long excersised their power without many to challenge it will take it personlly as if you are questioniong their character.
Your response to that shouylkd be youir own but mine would be...
I would only question the character or honor of someopne whom has been informed of the subject matter andwhopm ignores historical fact for what has become the norm of the day...
This would be how I present myself.
NOW, comes the Accused, appearing specially and not generally or voluntarily,
but under threat of arrest if he failed to do so, with this "BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF NOTICE FOR DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF SUBJCT MATTER JURISDICTION," stating as follows:
It is my position that there came a time in America where a great error was allowed to become policy. Either by misfeasance or malfeasance, it bears little difference as the result in injury to the people is what has become normalized. If we come to know the facts regarding this and do nothing, then we are as guilty of it as those who perpetrated the swindle of natural rights to be replaced with subjugation. What does freedom mean and how valuable is it if not that it is such that others would not seek to steal it? With all due respect, I would like the court to review the case law I enter in the record and either the prosecution or the court justify the jurisdiction I have been demanded to subject myself to unwillingly.
If ever a judge understood the public's right to use the
public roads, it was Justice Tolman of the Supreme Court of the
State of Washington. Justice Tolman stated:
"Complete freedom of the highways is so old and well established a
blessing that we have forgotten the days of the Robber Barons and
toll roads, and yet, under an act like this, arbitrarily administered,
the highways may be completely monopolized, if, through lack of interest, the
people submit, then they may look to see the most sacred of their liberties
taken from them one by one, by more or less rapid encroachment."
Robertson vs. Department of Public Works, 180 Wash 133, 147.
The words of Justice Tolman ring most prophetically in the ears of
Citizens throughout the country today as the use of the public roads has been
monopolized by the very entity which has been empowered to stand guard over our
freedoms, i.e., that of state government.
RIGHTS
The "most sacred of liberties" of which Justice Tolman spoke was
personal liberty. The definition of personal liberty is:
"Personal liberty, or the Right to enjoyment of life and liberty, is one
of the fundamental or natural Rights, which has been protected by its
inclusion as a guarantee in the various constitutions, which is not derived
from, or dependent on, the U.S. Constitution, which may not be submitted to
a vote and may not depend on the outcome of an election. It is one of the most
sacred and valuable Rights, as sacred as the Right to
private property ... and is regarded as inalienable."
16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sect.202, p.987
This concept is further amplified by the definition of personal liberty:
"Personal liberty largely consists of the Right of locomotion -- to
go where and when one pleases -- only so far restrained as the Rights of
others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. The Right of
the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his
property thereon, by horse drawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is
not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but
the common Right which he has under his Right to life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness. Under this Constitutional guarantee one may,
therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his inclination along the
public highways or in public places, and while conducting himself in
an orderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing
another's Rights, he will be protected, not only in his person, but in his
safe conduct."
II Am.Jur. (1st) Constitutional Law, Sect.329,
p.1135
and further ...
"Personal liberty -- consists of the power of locomotion, of changing
situations, of removing one's person to whatever place
one's inclination may direct, without imprisonment or restraint unless by
due process of law."
Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., Black's Law Dictionary, 5th
ed.;
Blackstone's Commentary 134; Hare, Constitution__Pg. 777
Blackstone's Commentary 134; Hare, Constitution__Pg. 777
Justice Tolman was concerned about the State prohibiting the Citizen
from the "most sacred of his liberties," the Right of movement,
the Right of moving one's self from place to place without threat of
imprisonment, the Right to use the public roads in the ordinary course of
life.
When the State allows the formation of a corporation it may control its
creation by establishing guidelines (statutes) for its
operation (charters). Corporations who use the roads in the course of
business do not use the roads in the ordinary course of life. There is a
difference between a corporation and an individual. The United States
Supreme Court has stated:
"...We are of the opinion that there is a clear distinction in this
particular between an individual and a corporation, and that the latter has
no right to refuse to submit its books and papers for examination on the
suit of the State. The individual may stand upon his Constitutional Rights
as a Citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in his
own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the State or to
his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors to investigation, so
far as it may tend to incriminate him. He owes no such duty to the State, since
he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life, liberty,
and property. His Rights are such as the law of the land long
antecedent to the organization of the state, and can only be taken from him by
due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his
Rights are the refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and
his property from arrest or seizure except under warrant of law. He
owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights.
"Upon the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the state. It is
presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It receives certain
special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws
of the state and the limitations of its charter. Its rights to act as a
corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its
creation. There is a reserved right in the legislature to investigate its
contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. It would be a strange
anomaly to hold that the State, having chartered a corporation to make use of
certain franchises, could not in exercise of its sovereignty inquire how those
franchises had been employed, and whether they had been abused, and demand the
production of corporate books and papers for that purpose."
Hale vs. Hinkel, 201 US 43, 74-75
Corporations engaged in mercantile equity fall under the purview of the
State's admiralty jurisdiction, and the public at large must be protected
from their activities, as they (the corporations) are engaged in business
for profit.
"...Based upon the fundamental ground that the sovereign state has
the plenary control of the streets and highways in the exercise of its
police power (see police power, infra.), may
absolutely prohibit the use of the streets as a place for the prosecution of a
private business for gain. They all recognize the fundamental distinction
between the ordinary Right of the Citizen to use the streets in the usual
way and the use of the streets as a place of business or a main instrumentality
of business for private gain. The former is a common Right, the latter
is an extraordinary use. As to the former, the legislative power is
confined to regulation, as to the latter, it is plenary and extends even to
absolute prohibition. Since the use of the streets by a common carrier in
the prosecution of its business as such is not a right but a mere license of
privilege."
Hadfield vs. Lundin, 98 Wash 516
It will be necessary to review early cases and legal authority in order to
reach a lawfully correct theory dealing with this Right
or "privilege." We will attempt to reach a sound conclusion as to
what is a "Right to use the road" and what is a
"privilege to use the road". Once reaching this determination,
we shall then apply those positions to modern case decision.
"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no
rule making or legislation which would abrogate them."
Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436, 491
and ...
"The claim and exercise of a constitutional Right cannot be converted
into a crime."
Miller vs. U.S., 230 F. 486, 489
and ...
"There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of this
exercise of constitutional Rights."
Snerer vs. Cullen, 481 F. 946
Streets and highways are established and maintained for the purpose of travel
and transportation by the public. Such travel may be for business or pleasure.
"The use of the highways for the purpose of travel and transportation is
not a mere privilege, but a common and fundamental Right of which the
public and the individual cannot be rightfully deprived."
Chicago Motor Coach vs. Chicago, 169 NE 22;
Ligare vs. Chicago, 28 NE 934;
Boon vs. Clark, 214 SSW 607;
25 Am.Jur. (1st) Highways Sect.163
Ligare vs. Chicago, 28 NE 934;
Boon vs. Clark, 214 SSW 607;
25 Am.Jur. (1st) Highways Sect.163
and ...
"The Right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to
transport his property thereon, either by horse drawn carriage or
by automobile, is not a mere privilege which a city can prohibit or permit
at will, but a common Right which he has under the right to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."
Thompson vs. Smith, 154 SE 579
So we can see that a Citizen has a Right to travel upon the
public highways by automobile and the Citizen cannot be rightfully deprived
of his Liberty. So where does the misconception that the use of the
public road is always and only a privilege come from?
"... For while a Citizen has the Right to travel upon the
public highways and to transport his property thereon, that Right does not
extend to the use of the highways, either in whole or in part, as a place for
private gain. For the latter purpose, no person has a vested right to
use the highways of the state, but is a privilege or a license which the
legislature may grant or withhold at its discretion."
State vs. Johnson, 243 P. 1073;
Cummins vs. Homes, 155 P. 171;
Packard vs. Banton, 44 S.Ct. 256;
Hadfield vs. Lundin, 98 Wash 516
Cummins vs. Homes, 155 P. 171;
Packard vs. Banton, 44 S.Ct. 256;
Hadfield vs. Lundin, 98 Wash 516
Here the court held that a Citizen has the Right to travel upon the
public highways, but that he did not have the right to conduct business
upon the highways. On this point of law all authorities are unanimous.
"Heretofore the court has held, and we think correctly, that while a
Citizen has the Right to travel upon the public highways and to transport
his property thereon, that Right does not extend to the use of the highways,
either in whole or in part, as a place of business for private gain."
Willis vs. Buck, 263 P. l 982;
Barney vs. Board of Railroad Commissioners, 17 P.2d 82
Barney vs. Board of Railroad Commissioners, 17 P.2d 82
and ...
"The right of the citizen to travel upon the highway and to transport his
property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, differs radically
and obviously from that of one who makes the highway his place of business for
private gain in the running of a stagecoach or omnibus."
State vs. City of Spokane, 186 P. 864
What is this Right of the Citizen which differs so
"radically and obviously" from one who uses the highway as a place
of business? Who better to enlighten us than Justice Tolman of the
Supreme Court of Washington State? In State vs. City
of Spokane, supra, the Court also noted a very
"radical and obvious" difference, but went on to explain just
what the difference is:
"The former is the usual and ordinary right of the Citizen, a
common right to all, while the latter is special, unusual,
and extraordinary."
and ...
"This distinction, elementary and fundamental in character, is recognized
by all the authorities."
State vs. City of Spokane, supra.
This position does not hang precariously upon only a few cases, but has been
proclaimed by an impressive array of cases ranging from the state courts to
the federal courts.
"the right of the Citizen to travel upon the highway and to transport his
property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business, differs radically
and obviously from that of one who makes the highway his place of business and
uses it for private gain in the running of a stagecoach or omnibus.
The former is the usual and ordinary right of the Citizen, a right common
to all, while the latter is special, unusual, and extraordinary."
Ex Parte Dickey, (Dickey vs. Davis), 85 SE 781
and ...
"The right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to
transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, is
a common right which he has under the right to enjoy life and liberty,
to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes
the right, in so doing, to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day,
and under the existing modes of travel, includes the right to drive a horse
drawn carriage or wagon thereon or to operate an automobile thereon, for
the usual and ordinary purpose of life and business."
Thompson vs. Smith, supra.;
Teche Lines vs. Danforth, Miss., 12 S.2d 784
Teche Lines vs. Danforth, Miss., 12 S.2d 784
There is no dissent among various authorities as to this position.
(See Am. Jur. [1st] Const. Law, 329 and
corresponding Am. Jur. [2nd].)
"Personal liberty -- or the right to enjoyment of life and liberty --
is one of the fundamental or natural rights, which has been protected by
its inclusion as a guarantee in the various constitutions, which is not
derived from nor dependent on the U.S. Constitution. ... It is
one of the most sacred and valuable rights [remember the words of
Justice Tolman, supra.] as sacred as the right to private
property ... and is regarded as inalienable."
16 C.J.S. Const. Law, Sect.202, Pg. 987
As we can see, the distinction between a "Right" to use the public
roads and a "privilege" to use the public roads is drawn upon the line of
"using the road as a place of business" and the various state courts have
held so. But what have the U.S. Courts held on this point?
"First, it is well established law that the highways of the state are
public property, and their primary and preferred use is for
private purposes, and that their use for purposes of gain is special and
extraordinary which, generally at least, the legislature may prohibit or
condition as it sees fit."
Stephenson vs. Rinford, 287 US 251;
Pachard vs Banton, 264 US 140, and cases cited;
Frost and F. Trucking Co. vs. Railroad Commission, 271 US 592;
Railroad commission vs. Inter-City Forwarding Co., 57 SW.2d 290;
Parlett Cooperative vs. Tidewater Lines, 164 A. 313
Pachard vs Banton, 264 US 140, and cases cited;
Frost and F. Trucking Co. vs. Railroad Commission, 271 US 592;
Railroad commission vs. Inter-City Forwarding Co., 57 SW.2d 290;
Parlett Cooperative vs. Tidewater Lines, 164 A. 313
So what is a privilege to use the roads? By now it should be apparent even to
the "learned" that an attempt to use the road as a place of business
is a privilege. The distinction must be drawn between ...
- Travelling upon and transporting one's property upon the public roads,
which is our Right; and ...
- Using the public roads as a place of business or a main instrumentality of
business, which is a privilege.
"[The roads] ... are constructed and maintained at public expense, and no person therefore, can insist that he has, or may acquire, a vested right to their use in carrying on a commercial business."Ex Parte Sterling, 53 SW.2d 294;
Barney vs. Railroad Commissioners, 17 P.2d 82;
Stephenson vs. Binford, supra."When the public highways are made the place of business the state has a right to regulate their use in the interest of safety and convenience of the public as well as the preservation of the highways."Thompson vs. Smith, supra."[The state's] right to regulate such use is based upon the nature of the business and the use of the highways in connection therewith."Ibid."We know of no inherent right in one to use the highways for commercial purposes. The highways are primarily for the use of the public, and in the interest of the public, the state may prohibit or regulate ... the use of the highways for gain."Robertson vs. Dept. of Public Works, supra.
There should be considerable authority on a subject as important a this
deprivation of the liberty of the individual "using the roads in the
ordinary course of life and business." However, it should be noted
that extensive research has not turned up one case or authority acknowledging
the state's power to convert the individual's right to travel upon the
public roads into a "privilege."
Therefore, it is concluded that the Citizen does have a "Right"
to travel and transport his property upon the public highways and roads and
the exercise of this Right is not a "privilege."
DEFINITIONS
In order to understand the correct application of the statute in question, we
must first define the terms used in connection with this point of law. As will
be shown, many terms used today do not, in their legal context, mean what we
assume they mean, thus resulting in the misapplication of statutes in the
instant case.
AUTOMOBILE AND MOTOR VEHICLE
There is a clear distinction between an automobile and a motor vehicle.
An automobile has been defined as:
"The word `automobile' connotes a pleasure vehicle designed for the
transportation of persons on highways."
American Mutual Liability Ins. Co., vs. Chaput, 60 A.2d 118,
120; 95 NH 200
While the distinction is made clear between the two as the courts
have stated:
"A motor vehicle or automobile for hire is a motor vehicle, other than an
automobile stage, used for the transportation of persons for which remuneration
is received."
International Motor Transit Co. vs. Seattle, 251 P.
120
The term `motor vehicle' is different and broader than the
word `automobile.'"
City of Dayton vs. DeBrosse, 23 NE.2d 647, 650; 62 Ohio App.
232
The distinction is made very clear in Title 18 USC 31:
"Motor vehicle" means every description or other contrivance
propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for
commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers,
or passengers and property.
"Used for commercial purposes" means the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge or other considerations, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit.
"Used for commercial purposes" means the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge or other considerations, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit.
Clearly, an automobile is private property in use for
private purposes, while a motor vehicle is a machine which may be used
upon the highways for trade, commerce, or hire.
TRAVEL
The term "travel" is a significant term and is defined as:
"The term `travel' and `traveler' are usually construed in their broad and
general sense ... so as to include all those who rightfully use the
highways viatically (when being reimbursed for expenses) and who have
occasion to pass over them for the purpose of business, convenience,
or pleasure."
25 Am.Jur. (1st) Highways, Sect.427, Pg. 717
"Traveler -- One who passes from place to place, whether for
pleasure, instruction, business, or health."
Locket vs. State, 47 Ala. 45;
Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., Pg. 3309
Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., Pg. 3309
"Travel -- To journey or to pass through or over; as a country
district, road, etc. To go from one place to another, whether on foot,
or horseback, or in any conveyance as a train, an automobile,
carriage, ship, or aircraft; Make a journey."
Century Dictionary, Pg. 2034
Therefore, the term "travel" or "traveler" refers to one who
uses a conveyance to go from one place to another, and included all those who
use the highways as a matter of Right.
Notice that in all these definitions, the phrase "for hire" never
occurs. This term "travel" or "traveler" implies,
by definition, one who uses the road as a means to move from one place
to another.
Therefore, one who uses the road in the ordinary course of life and business
for the purpose of travel and transportation is a traveler.
DRIVER
The term "driver" in contradistinction to "traveler," is
defined as:
"Driver -- One employed in conducting a coach, carriage, wagon, or
other vehicle ..."
Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., Pg. 940
Notice that this definition includes one who is "employed" in
conducting a vehicle. It should be self-evident that this individual could not
be "travelling" on a journey, but is using the road as a place
of business.
OPERATOR
Today we assume that a "traveler" is a "driver," and
a "driver" is an "operator." However, this is not
the case.
"It will be observed from the language of the ordinance that a distinction
is to be drawn between the terms `operator'
and `driver'; the `operator' of the service car being
the person who is licensed to have the car on the streets in the business of
carrying passengers for hire; while the `driver' is the one who
actually drives the car. However, in the actual prosecution of business, it was
possible for the same person to be both `operator'
and `driver.'"
Newbill vs. Union Indemnity Co., 60 SE.2d 658
To further clarify the definition of an "operator" the court observed
that this was a vehicle "for hire" and that it was in the business
of carrying passengers.
This definition would seem to describe a person who is using the road as a
place of business, or in other words, a person engaged in
the "privilege" of using the road for gain.
This definition, then, is a further clarification of the distinction
mentioned earlier, and therefore:
- Travelling upon and transporting one's property upon the
public roads as a matter of Right meets the definition of
a traveler.
- Using the road as a place of business as a matter of privilege meets the definition of a driver or an operator or both.
TRAFFIC
Having defined the terms "automobile," "motor vehicle,"
"traveler," "driver," and "operator," the next term to
define is "traffic":
"... Traffic thereon is to some extent destructive, therefore, the prevention
of unnecessary duplication of auto transportation service will lengthen the life
of the highways or reduce the cost of maintenance, the revenue derived by the
state ... will also tend toward the public welfare by producing
at the expense of those operating for private gain, some small part of the
cost of repairing the wear ..."
Northern Pacific R.R. Co. vs. Schoenfeldt, 213 P.
26
Note: In the above, Justice Tolman expounded upon the key of raising
revenue by taxing the "privilege" to use the public roads
"at the expense of those operating for gain."
In this case, the word "traffic" is used in conjunction with the
unnecessary Auto Transportation Service, or in other words,
"vehicles for hire." The word "traffic" is another
word which is to be strictly construed to the conducting of business.
"Traffic -- Commerce, trade, sale or exchange of merchandise,
bills, money, or the like. The passing of goods and commodities from one
person to another for an equivalent in goods or money ..."
Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., Pg. 3307
Here again, notice that this definition refers to one
"conducting business." No mention is made of one who is travelling
in his automobile. This definition is of one who is engaged in the passing of a
commodity or goods in exchange for money, i.e .., vehicles
for hire.
Furthermore, the word "traffic" and "travel" must
have different meanings which the courts recognize. The difference is recognized
in Ex Parte Dickey, supra:
"...in addition to this, cabs, hackney coaches, omnibuses, taxicabs, and
hacks, when unnecessarily numerous, interfere with the ordinary traffic and
travel and obstruct them."
The court, by using both terms, signified its recognition of a distinction
between the two. But, what was the distinction? We have already defined both
terms, but to clear up any doubt:
"The word `traffic' is manifestly used here in secondary sense, and has
reference to the business of transportation rather than to its primary meaning
of interchange of commodities."
Allen vs. City of Bellingham, 163 P. 18
Here the Supreme Court of the State of Washington has defined
the word "traffic" (in either its primary or
secondary sense) in reference to business, and not to mere travel! So it is
clear that the term "traffic" is business related and therefore, it is
a "privilege." The net result being that "traffic" is
brought under the (police) power of the legislature. The term has no
application to one who is not using the roads as a place
of business.
LICENSE
It seems only proper to define the word "license," as the
definition of this word will be extremely important in understanding the
statutes as they are properly applied:
"The permission, by competent authority to do an act which without
permission, would be illegal, a trespass, or a tort."
People vs. Henderson, 218 NW.2d 2, 4
"Leave to do a thing which licensor could prevent."
Western Electric Co. vs. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 42 F.2d 116,
118
In order for these two definitions to apply in this case, the state
would have to take up the position that the exercise of a
Constitutional Right to use the public roads in the ordinary course of
life and business is illegal, a trespass, or a tort, which the state
could then regulate or prevent.
This position, however, would raise magnitudinous
Constitutional questions as this position would be diametrically opposed to
fundamental Constitutional Law. (See "Conversion of a Right to
a Crime," infra.)
In the instant case, the proper definition of
a "license" is:
"a permit, granted by an appropriate governmental body, generally for
consideration, to a person, firm, or corporation, to pursue some occupation
or to carry on some business which is subject to regulation under the
police power."
Rosenblatt vs. California State Board of Pharmacy, 158 P.2d
199, 203
This definition would fall more in line with the "privilege" of
carrying on business on the streets.
Most people tend to think that "licensing" is imposed by the state for
the purpose of raising revenue, yet there may well be more subtle reasons
contemplated; for when one seeks permission from someone to do something he
invokes the jurisdiction of the "licensor" which, in this case, is
the state. In essence, the licensee may well be seeking to be regulated by
the "licensor."
"A license fee is a charge made primarily for regulation, with the fee to
cover costs and expenses of supervision or regulation."
State vs. Jackson, 60 Wisc.2d 700; 211 NW.2d 480,
487
The fee is the price; the regulation or control of the licensee is the real
aim of the legislation.
Are these licenses really used to fund legitimate government, or are they
nothing more than a subtle introduction of police power into every facet of
our lives? Have our "enforcement agencies" been diverted from
crime prevention, perhaps through no fault of their own, instead now
busying themselves as they "check" our papers to see that all are
properly endorsed by the state?
How much longer will it be before we are forced to get a license for our
lawn mowers, or before our wives will need a license for
her "blender" or "mixer?" They all have motors on them
and the state can always use the revenue.
POLICE POWER
The confusion of the police power with the power of taxation usually
arises in cases where the police power has affixed a penalty to a certain act,
or where it requires licenses to be obtained and a certain sum be paid for
certain occupations. The power used in the instant case cannot, however, be the
power of taxation since an attempt to levy a tax upon a Right would be open
to Constitutional objection.
(See "taxing power," infra.)
Each law relating to the use of police power must ask
three questions:
"1. Is there threatened danger?
"2. Does a regulation involve a Constitutional Right?
"3. Is this regulation reasonable?
"2. Does a regulation involve a Constitutional Right?
"3. Is this regulation reasonable?
People vs. Smith, 108 Am.St.Rep. 715;
Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., under "Police Power"
Bovier's Law Dictionary, 1914 ed., under "Police Power"
When applying these three questions to the statute in question, some
very important issues emerge.
First, "is there a threatened danger" in the individual using his
automobile on the public highways, in the ordinary course of life
and business?
The answer is No! There is nothing
inherently dangerous in the use of an automobile when it is carefully managed.
Their guidance, speed, and noise are subject to a quick and easy control, under
a competent and considerate manager, it is as harmless on the road as
a horse and buggy.
It is the manner of managing the automobile, and that alone, which threatens
the safety of the public. The ability to stop quickly and to respond quickly to
guidance would seem to make the automobile one of the least dangerous
conveyances. (See Yale Law Journal,
December, 1905.)
"The automobile is not inherently dangerous."
Cohens vs. Meadow, 89 SE 876;
Blair vs. Broadmore, 93 SE 532
Blair vs. Broadmore, 93 SE 532
To deprive all persons of the Right to use the road in the ordinary course of
life and business, because one might, in the future, become dangerous, would be
a deprivation not only of the Right to travel, but also the Right to
due process. (See "Due Process," infra.)
Next; does the regulation involve a Constitutional Right?
This question has already been addressed and answered in this brief, and need
not be reinforced other than to remind this Court that this Citizen
does have the Right to travel upon the public highway by automobile in
the ordinary course of life and business. It can therefore be concluded that
this regulation does involve a Constitutional Right.
The third question is the most important in this case. "Is this
regulation reasonable?"
The answer is No! It will be shown
later in "Regulation," infra., that this licensing statute is
oppressive and could be effectively administered by less oppressive means.
Although the Fourteenth Amendment does not interfere with
the proper exercise of the police power, in accordance with the general
principle that the power must be exercised so as not to invade unreasonably the
rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, it is established
beyond question that every state power, including the police power, is
limited by the Fourteenth Amendment (and others) and by
the inhibitions there imposed.
Moreover, the ultimate test of the propriety of police power regulations
must be found in the Fourteenth Amendment, since it operates
to limit the field of the police power to the extent of preventing the
enforcement of statutes in denial of Rights that the Amendment protects.
(See Parks vs. State, 64 NE 682.)
"With regard particularly to the U.S. Constitution, it is elementary
that a Right secured or protected by that document cannot be overthrown or
impaired by any state police authority."
Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 US 540;
Lafarier vs. Grand Trunk R.R. Co., 24 A. 848;
O'Neil vs. Providence Amusement Co., 108 A. 887
Lafarier vs. Grand Trunk R.R. Co., 24 A. 848;
O'Neil vs. Providence Amusement Co., 108 A. 887
". . the assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the name of local practice." [Davis v. Wechsler, 263 US 22, at 24 (1923)]
"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them."
[Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 491 (1966)]
"The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot thus be converted into a crime."
[Miller v. U.S., 230 F.2d 486, at 489 (1956)]
". . .there can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of his exercise of constitutional rights."
[Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F.2d 946 (1973)]
"The police power of the state must be exercised in subordination to the
provisions of the U.S. Constitution."
Bacahanan vs. Wanley, 245 US 60;
Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. vs. State Highway Commission, 294 US 613
Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. vs. State Highway Commission, 294 US 613
"It is well settled that the Constitutional Rights protected from invasion
by the police power, include Rights safeguarded both by express and implied
prohibitions in the Constitutions."
Tiche vs. Osborne, 131 A. 60
"As a rule, fundamental limitations of regulations under the police power
are found in the spirit of the Constitutions, not in the letter, although
they are just as efficient as if expressed in the clearest language."
Mehlos vs. Milwaukee, 146 NW 882
As it applies in the instant case, the language of the
Fifth Amendment is clear:
"No person shall be ... deprived of Life, Liberty, or Property
without due process of law."
As has been shown, the courts at all levels have firmly established an
absolute Right to travel.
In the instant case, the state, by applying commercial statutes to
all entities, natural and artificial persons alike, has deprived this free
and natural person of the Right of Liberty, without cause and
without due process of law.
DUE PROCESS
"The essential elements of due process of law are ... Notice and
The Opportunity to defend."
Simon vs. Craft, 182 US 427
Yet, not one individual has been given notice of the loss of
his/her Right, let alone before signing the license (contract).
Nor was the Citizen given any opportunity to defend against the loss of
his/her right to travel, by automobile, on the highways, in the
ordinary course of life and business. This amounts to an arbitrary
deprivation of Liberty.
"There should be no arbitrary deprivation of Life or Liberty ..."
Barbour vs. Connolly, 113 US 27, 31;
Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 US 356
Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 118 US 356
and ...
"The right to travel is part of the Liberty of which a citizen cannot
deprived without due process of law under the
Fifth Amendment. This Right was emerging as early as the
Magna Carta."
Kent vs. Dulles, 357 US 116 (1958)
The focal point of this question of police power and due process must balance
upon the point of making the public highways a safe place for the
public to travel. If a man travels in a manner that creates actual damage, an
action would lie (civilly) for recovery of damages. The state could
then also proceed against the individual to deprive him of his Right to use
the public highways, for cause. This process would fulfill the
due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment while at
the same time insuring that Rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and
the state constitutions would be protected.
But unless or until harm or damage (a crime) is committed, there
is no cause for interference in the private affairs or actions of
a Citizen.
One of the most famous and perhaps the most quoted definitions of
due process of law, is that of Daniel Webster in his
Dartmouth College Case (4 Wheat 518), in which
he declared that by due process is meant:
"a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry,
and renders judgment only after trial."
See also State vs. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020;
Dennis vs. Moses, 52 P. 333
Dennis vs. Moses, 52 P. 333
Somewhat similar is the statement that is a rule as old as the law that:
"no one shall be personally bound (restricted) until he has had his day in
court,"
by which is meant, until he has been duly cited to appear and has been
afforded an opportunity to be heard. Judgment without such citation and
opportunity lacks all the attributes of a judicial determination; it is judicial
usurpation and it is oppressive and can never be upheld where it is fairly
administered. (12 Am.Jur. [1st] Const. Law,
Sect. 573, Pg. 269)
Note: This
sounds like the process used to deprive one of the "privilege" of
operating a motor vehicle "for hire." It should be kept in
mind, however, that we are discussing the arbitrary deprivation of
the Right to use the road that all citizens
have "in common."
The futility of the state's position can be most easily observed in
the 1959 Washington Attorney General's opinion on a
similar issue:
"The distinction between the Right of the Citizen to use the public
highways for private, rather than commercial purposes is
recognized ..."
and ...
"Under its power to regulate private uses of our highways, our legislature
has required that motor vehicle operators be
licensed (I.C. 49-307). Undoubtedly, the primary purpose of this
requirement is to insure, as far as possible, that all motor vehicle
operators will be competent and qualified, thereby reducing the potential hazard
or risk of harm, to which other users of the highways might otherwise be
subject. But once having complied with this regulatory provision, by obtaining
the required license, a motorist enjoys the privilege of travelling freely upon
the highways ..."
Washington A.G.O. 59-60 No. 88, Pg. 11
This alarming opinion appears to be saying that every person using an
automobile as a matter of Right, must give up the Right and convert
the Right into a privilege. This is accomplished under the guise of
regulation. This statement is indicative of the insensitivity, even the
ignorance, of the government to the limits placed upon governments by and
through the several constitutions.
This legal theory may have been able to stand in 1959; however, as
of 1966, in the United States Supreme Court decision
in Miranda, even this weak defense of the
state's actions must fall.
"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no
rule making or legislation which would abrogate them."
Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436, 491
Thus the legislature does not have the power to abrogate the
Citizen's Right to travel upon the public roads, by passing
legislation forcing the citizen to waive his Right and convert that Right
into a privilege. Furthermore, we have previously established that
this "privilege" has been defined as applying only to those who are
"conducting business in the streets" or
"operating for-hire vehicles."
The legislature has attempted (by legislative fiat) to
deprive the Citizen of his Right to use the roads in the ordinary
course of life and business, without affording the Citizen the
safeguard of "due process of law." This has been accomplished
under supposed powers of regulation.
REGULATION
"In addition to the requirement that regulations governing the use of the
highways must not be violative of constitutional guarantees, the prime
essentials of such regulation are reasonableness, impartiality, and definiteness
or certainty."
25 Am.Jur. (1st) Highways, Sect. 260
and ...
"Moreover, a distinction must be observed between the regulation of an
activity which may be engaged in as a matter of right and one carried on by
government sufferance of permission."
Davis vs. Massachusetts, 167 US 43;
Pachard vs. Banton, supra.
Pachard vs. Banton, supra.
One can say for certain that these regulations are impartial since they are
being applied to all, even though they are clearly beyond the limits of the
legislative powers. However, we must consider whether such regulations are
reasonable and non-violative of constitutional guarantees.
First, let us consider the reasonableness of this statute requiring all
persons to be licensed (presuming that we are applying this statute to all
persons using the public roads). In determining the reasonableness of the
statute we need only ask two questions:
1. Does the statute accomplish its stated goal?
The answer is No!
The attempted explanation for this regulation "to insure the safety
of the public by insuring, as much as possible, that all are competent
and qualified."
However, one can keep his license without retesting, from the time he/she is
first licensed until the day he/she dies, without regard to the competency of
the person, by merely renewing said license before it expires. It is therefore
possible to completely skirt the goal of this attempted regulation, thus proving
that this regulation does not accomplish its goal.
Furthermore, by testing and licensing, the state gives the appearance of
underwriting the competence of the licensees, and could therefore be held liable
for failures, accidents, etc. caused by licensees.
2. Is the statute reasonable?
The answer is No!
This statute cannot be determined to be reasonable since it requires to the
Citizen to give up his or her natural Right to travel unrestricted in order
to accept the privilege. The purported goal of this statute could be met by much
less oppressive regulations, i.e., competency tests and certificates of
competency before using an automobile upon the public roads. (This is
exactly the situation in the aviation sector.)
But isn't this what we have now?
The answer is No! The real purpose of
this license is much more insidious. When one signs the license, he/she gives up
his/her Constitutional Right to travel in order to accept and exercise
a privilege. After signing the license, a quasi-contract, the Citizen
has to give the state his/her consent to be prosecuted for constructive crimes
and quasi-criminal actions where there is no harm done and no damaged property.
These prosecutions take place without affording the Citizen of their
Constitutional Rights and guarantees such a the Right to a trial by
jury of twelve persons and the Right to counsel, as well as the normal
safeguards such as proof of intent and a corpus dilecti and a
grand jury indictment. These unconstitutional prosecutions take place
because the Citizen is exercising a privilege and has given his/her
"implied consent" to legislative enactments designed to control
interstate commerce, a regulatable enterprise under the police power
of the state.
We must now conclude that the Citizen is forced to give up Constitutional
guarantees of "Right" in order to exercise his state
"privilege" to travel upon the public highways in the ordinary
course of life and business.
SURRENDER OF RIGHTS
A Citizen cannot be forced to give up his/her Rights in the name
of regulation.
"... the only limitations found restricting the right of the state to
condition the use of the public highways as a means of vehicular
transportation for compensation are (1) that the state must not
exact of those it permits to use the highways for hauling for gain that they
surrender any of their inherent U.S. Constitutional Rights as a
condition precedent to obtaining permission for such use ..."
Riley vs. Laeson, 142 So. 619;
Stephenson vs. Binford, supra.
Stephenson vs. Binford, supra.
If one cannot be placed in a position of being forced to
surrender Rights in order to exercise a privilege, how much more must
this maxim of law, then, apply when one is simply exercising
(putting into use) a Right?
"To be that statute which would deprive a Citizen of the rights of person
or property, without a regular trial, according to the course and usage of the
common law, would not be the law of the land."
Hoke vs. Henderson, 15 NC 15
and ...
"We find it intolerable that one Constitutional Right should have to
be surrendered in order to assert another."
Simons vs. United States, 390 US 389
Since the state requires that one give up Rights in order to exercise the
privilege of driving, the regulation cannot stand under the police power,
due process, or regulation, but must be exposed as a statute
which is oppressive and one which has been misapplied to deprive the Citizen
of Rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the
state constitutions.
TAXING POWER
"Any claim that this statute is a taxing statute would be immediately open
to severe Constitutional objections. If it could be said that the state had the
power to tax a Right, this would enable the state to destroy Rights
guaranteed by the constitution through the use of oppressive taxation. The
question herein, is one of the state taxing the Right to travel by the
ordinary modes of the day, and whether this is a legislative object of the
state taxation.
The views advanced herein are neither novel nor unsupported by authority.
The question of taxing power of the states has been repeatedly considered
by the Supreme Court. The Right of the state to impede or embarrass the
Constitutional operation of the U.S. Government or the Rights which the
Citizen holds under it, has been uniformly denied."
McCulloch vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316
The power to tax is the power to destroy, and if the state is given the power
to destroy Rights through taxation, the framers of the Constitution wrote that
document in vain.
"... It may be said that a tax of one dollar for passing through
the state cannot sensibly affect any function of government or deprive
a Citizen of any valuable Right. But if a state can
tax ... a passenger of one dollar, it can tax him
a thousand dollars."
Crandall vs. Nevada, 6 Wall 35, 46
and ...
"If the Right of passing through a state by a Citizen of the
United States is one guaranteed by the Constitution, it must be sacred from
state taxation."
Ibid., Pg. 47
Therefore, the Right of travel must be kept sacred from all forms of
state taxation and if this argument is used by the state as a defense of
the enforcement of this statute, then this argument also must fail.
CONVERSION OF A RIGHT TO A CRIME
As previously demonstrated, the Citizen has the Right to travel and to
transport his property upon the public highways in the ordinary course
of life and business. However, if one exercises this Right to travel
(without first giving up the Right and converting that Right into
a privilege) the Citizen is by statute, guilty of a crime. This
amounts to converting the exercise of a Constitutional Right into
a crime.
Recall the Miller vs. U.S. and
Snerer vs. Cullen quotes from Pg. 5, and:
"The state cannot diminish Rights of the people."
Hurtado vs. California, 110 US 516
and ...
"Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no
rule making or legislation which would abrogate them."
Miranda, supra.
Indeed, the very purpose for creating the state under the limitations of the
constitution was to protect the rights of the people from intrusion,
particularly by the forces of government.
So we can see that any attempt by the legislature to make the act of using
the public highways as a matter of Right into a crime, is void upon its
face.
Any person who claims his Right to travel upon the highways, and so exercises
that Right, cannot be tried for a crime of doing so. And yet, this Freeman
stands before this court today to answer charges for the "crime" of
exercising his Right to Liberty.
As we have already shown, the term "drive" can only apply to
those who are employed in the business of transportation for hire. It has
been shown that freedom includes the Citnzen's Right to use the
public highways in the ordinary course of life and business without
license or regulation by the police powers of the state.
CONCLUSION
It is the duty of the court to recognize the substance of things and not the
mere form.
"The courts are not bound by mere form, nor are they to be misled by mere
pretenses. They are at liberty -- indeed they are under a solemn
duty -- to look at the substance of things, whenever they enter upon the
inquiry whether the legislature has transcended the limits of its authority. If,
therefore, a statute purported to have been enacted to protect ... the
public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects or is
a palpable invasion of Rights secured by the fundamental law, it
is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to
the Constitution."
Mulger vs. Kansas, 123 US 623, 661
and ...
"It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the
Constitutional rights of the citizen and against any stealthy encroachments
thereon."
Boyd vs. United States, 116 US 616
The courts are "duty bound" to recognize and stop the
"stealthy encroachments" which have been made upon the Citizen's
Right to travel and to use the roads to transport his property in the
"ordinary course of life and business."
(Hadfield, supra.)
Further, the court must recognize that the Right to travel is part
of the Liberty of which a Citizen cannot be deprived without specific cause and
without the "due process of law" guaranteed in the
Fifth Amendment. (Kent, supra.)
The history of this "invasion" of the Citizen's Right to use the
public highways shows clearly that the politicians learned how to control citizens by using commercial law where it did nopt belong. Much as is done with the "commerce clause" being used to navigate around the 2nd Amendment. It is overreach, it may be "legal" but it is absolutely "unlawful.
Ask yourselves... why do those using this information find themselves being accused of domestic terroristoic activity and labeled as "sovereign citizens"? It would appear to me that is the pot calling rthe kettle black to assume one has the right to infrionge on the rights of another who has caused them no injury because a bunch of guys in suits said so. In La Cosa Nostra that is called collections, and is extortion. Why is it any different what the orghanization calls itslef that acts in this way?
But everyone has been so programmed that we need ouir private lives invaded for public safety...
ok... safety huh? So then a government policy enfiorcer should then have a duty to protect you.... whoops... they don't?
Imagine that.
Copyright Disclaimer Under Section 107 of the Copyright Act 1976, allowance is made for "fair use" for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. Fair use is a use permitted by copyright statute that might otherwise be infringing. Non-profit, educational or personal use tips the balance in favor of fair use.
Ask yourselves... why do those using this information find themselves being accused of domestic terroristoic activity and labeled as "sovereign citizens"? It would appear to me that is the pot calling rthe kettle black to assume one has the right to infrionge on the rights of another who has caused them no injury because a bunch of guys in suits said so. In La Cosa Nostra that is called collections, and is extortion. Why is it any different what the orghanization calls itslef that acts in this way?
But everyone has been so programmed that we need ouir private lives invaded for public safety...
ok... safety huh? So then a government policy enfiorcer should then have a duty to protect you.... whoops... they don't?
Imagine that.
Copyright Disclaimer Under Section 107 of the Copyright Act 1976, allowance is made for "fair use" for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. Fair use is a use permitted by copyright statute that might otherwise be infringing. Non-profit, educational or personal use tips the balance in favor of fair use.
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